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Abstract
Despite the remarkable success of deep neural net-
works, significant concerns have emerged about
their robustness to adversarial perturbations to in-
puts. While most attacks aim to ensure that these
are imperceptible, physical perturbation attacks
typically aim for being unsuspicious, even if per-
ceptible. However, there is no universal notion of
what it means for adversarial examples to be un-
suspicious. We propose an approach for modeling
suspiciousness by leveraging cognitive salience.
Specifically, we split an image into foreground
(salient region) and background (the rest), and al-
low significantly larger adversarial perturbations
in the background. We describe how to compute
the resulting dual-perturbation attacks on both
deterministic and stochastic classifiers. We then
experimentally demonstrate that our attacks do
not significantly change perceptual salience of
the background, but are highly effective against
classifiers robust to conventional attacks. Fur-
thermore, we show that adversarial training with
dual-perturbation attacks yields classifiers that are
more robust to these than state-of-the-art robust
learning approaches, and comparable in terms of
robustness to conventional attacks.
1. Introduction
An observation by Szegedy et al. (2014) that state-of-the-art
deep neural networks that exhibit exceptional performance
in image classification are fragile in the face of small adver-
sarial perturbations of inputs has received a great deal of
attention. A series of approaches for designing adversarial
examples followed (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al.,
2015; Carlini & Wagner, 2017), along with methods for
defending against them (Papernot et al., 2016b; Madry et al.,
2018), and then new attacks that defeat prior defenses, and
so on. Attacks can be roughly classified along three dimen-
sions: 1) introducing small lp-norm-bounded perturbations,
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Figure 1. An illustration of dual-perturbation attacks. The top uses
semantic segmentartion to identify foreground and background.
The bottom uses object bounding box.
with the goal of these being imperceptible to humans (Madry
et al., 2018), 2) using non-lp-based constraints that capture
perceptibility (often called semantic perturbations) (Bhattad
et al., 2020), and 3) modifying physical objects, such as stop
signs (Eykholt et al., 2018), in a way that does not arouse
suspicion. One of the most common motivations for the
study of adversarial examples is safety and security, such
as the potential for attackers to compromise the safety of
autonomous vehicles that rely on computer vision (Eykholt
et al., 2018). However, while imperceptibility is certainly
sufficient for perturbations to be unsuspicious, it is far from
necessary, as physical attacks demonstrate. On the other
hand, while there are numerous formal definitions that cap-
ture whether noise is perceptible (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2016; Carlini & Wagner, 2017), what makes adversarial ex-
amples suspicious has been largely informal and subjective.
We propose a simple formalization of an important aspect of
what makes adversarial perturbations unsuspicious. Specif-
ically, we make a distinction between image foreground
and background, allowing significantly more noise in the
background than the foreground. This idea stems from the
notion of cognitive salience (Borji et al., 2015; Kmmerer
et al., 2017; He & Pugeault, 2018), whereby an image can
be partitioned into the two respective regions to reflect how
much attention a human viewer pays to the different parts
of the captured scene. In effect, we posit that perturbations
in the foreground, when visible, will arouse significantly
more suspicion (by being cognitively more salient) than
perturbations made in the background.
Our first contribution is a formal model of such dual-
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perturbation attacks, which is a generalization of the lp-
norm-bounded attack models. Second, we propose an al-
gorithm for finding adversarial examples using this model,
which is an adaptation of the PGD attack (Madry et al.,
2018), as well as two approaches for partitioning images
into foreground and background, the first using object detec-
tion and the second using segmentation (see, e.g., Figure 1).
Third, we present two methods for defending against dual-
perturbation attacks, both based on the adversarial training
framework (Madry et al., 2018). Finally, we present an
extensive experimental study that demonstrates that (a) the
proposed attacks are significantly stronger than PGD, suc-
cessfully defeating all state-of-the-art defenses, (b) proposed
defenses using our attack model significantly outperform
state-of-the-art alternatives, with relatively small perfor-
mance degradation on non-adversarial instances, and (c)
proposed defenses are comparable to, or better than alterna-
tives even against traditional attacks, such as PGD.
Related Work Recent studies have shown that neural net-
works are vulnerable to adversarial examples. A variety
of approaches have been proposed to produce adversarial
examples (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Pa-
pernot et al., 2016a; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini
& Wagner, 2017). These approaches commonly generate
adversarial perturbations within a bounded `p norm so that
the perturbations are imperceptible. A related thread has
considered the problem of generating adversarial examples
that are semantically imperceptible without being small in
norm (Brown et al., 2018; Bhattad et al., 2020), for example,
through small perturbations to the color scheme. However,
none of these account for the perceptual distinction between
the foreground and background of images.
Numerous approaches have been proposed for defending
neural networks against adversarial examples (Papernot
et al., 2016b; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Madry et al., 2018;
Cohen et al., 2019; Madry et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al.,
2018). Predominantly, these use `p-bounded perturbations
as the threat model, and while some account for semantic
perturbations (e.g. (Mohapatra et al., 2020)), none consider
perceptually important difference in suspiciousness between
foreground and background.
A recent approach by Vaishnavi et al. (2019) has the
strongest conceptual connection to our work. However, it is
defense-focused, and assumes that we can reliably segment
an image at prediction time, leaving the approach vulnerable
to attacks on image segmentation (Arnab et al., 2018).
2. Background
In this section, we first introduce adversarial examples and
attacks to produce these. We then summarize two repre-
sentative approaches for training neural networks that are
robust to adversarial examples.
2.1. Adversarial Examples and Attacks
The problem of generating adversarial examples is com-
monly modeled as follows. We are given a a learned model
hθ(·) parameterized by θ which maps an input x to a k-
dimensional prediction, where k is the number of classes
being predicted. The final predicted class yp is obtained by
yp = arg maxi hθ(x)i, where hθ(x)i is the ith element of
hθ(x). Now, consider an input x along with a correct label
y. The problem of identifying an adversarial example for x
can be captured by the following optimization problem:
max
δ∈∆()
L (hθ(x+ δ), y) (1)
where L(·) is the loss function used to train the classifier hθ
and ∆() is the feasible perturbation space which is com-
monly represented as a `p ball: ∆() = {δ : ‖δ‖p ≤ }.
A number of approaches have been proposed to solve the
optimization problem shown in Eq. (1), among which two
are viewed as state of the art: CW attack developed by
(Carlini & Wagner, 2017), and Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) attack proposed in Madry et al. (2018). In this work,
we focus on the PGD attack with `∞ and `2 as the distance
metrics. In the PGD approach, we solve the problem in
Eq. (1) by iteratively updating the adversarial perturbation
as follows:
δ(k+1) = P(δ(k) + αG(∇δ(k)L(hθ(x+ δ(k)), y))) (2)
where δ(k) is the perturbation at the k-th iteration, α is the
step size in each iteration, P is a projection to ensure that
δ(k) is feasible, for example, ‖δ‖p ≤  and x + δ(k) is
clipped to feasible pixel values; and G returns the update
corresponding to the normalized steepest descent given the
gradient. Note that both the realization of P and G depend
on the `p distance used in the PGD attack. Specifically, for
the `∞ PGD attack,{
G(m) = sign(m)
P(n) = clip (n, [−1,+1]
⋂
[−x,1− x])
where sign returns the sign matrix of an input, 11 is an all-
ones matrix that has the same dimensions as δ(k), and clip
is an operator that clip the each element of a given input
in an element-wise manner. When it comes to the `2 PGD
attack,{
G(m) = m||m||2
P(n) = clip( nmax{,||n||2} , [−x,1− x])
.
1Generally, images are preprocessed such that pixels are di-
vided by 255 for computational convenience in training and testing.
Consequently, a feasible pixel value should lie in [0,1].
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Since the adversarial optimization problem is non-convex,
PGD is typically augmented by using a number of random
starting points for adversarial perturbations that are close to
the original input x (Madry et al., 2018).
2.2. Robust Learning
Here, we describe two categorizations of defense that have
proved both sufficiently scalable and effective even against
adaptive attacks: adversarial training (Szegedy et al., 2014;
Cohen et al., 2019; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Madry et al.,
2018) and randomized smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019;
Lecuyer et al., 2019).
Adversarial Training. The basic idea of adversarial train-
ing is to produce adversarial examples and incorporate these
into the training process. Formally, adversarial training aims
to solve the following robust learning problem:
min
θ
1
|D|
∑
x,y∈D
max
‖δ‖p≤
L (hθ(x+ δ), y) (3)
where D is the training dataset. In practice, this problem
is commonly solved by iteratively using the following two
steps (Madry et al., 2018): 1) use a PGD (or other) attack
to produce adversarial examples of the training data; 2)
use any optimizer to minimize the loss of those adversarial
examples. It has been shown that adversarial training can
significantly boost the adversarial robustness of a classifier
against `p attacks, and it can be scaled to neural networks
with complex architectures.
Randomized Smoothing. The second class of methods for
robust learning considers adding random perturbations to
inputs at both training and test time. The basic idea is to
construct a new smoothed classifier gθ(·) from a base classi-
fier hθ(·) as follows: first, the base classifier hθ(·) is trained
with Gaussian data augmentation with variance σ2; then,
for any input x at test time, the smoothed classifier gθ(·)
returns the class that has the highest probability measure
for the base classifier hθ(·) when inputs are perturbed with
isotropic Gaussian noise:
gθ(x) = arg max
c
P (hθ(x+ η) = c)
where η ∼ N (0, σ2I) . (4)
It has been shown that randomized smoothing can provide
certified robustness to adversarial perturbations for `2-norm-
bounded attacks (Cohen et al., 2019; Lecuyer et al., 2019).
3. Dual-Perturbation Attacks
In this section, we introduce a novel threat model, the dual-
perturbation attack, against state-of-the-art adversarially
robust image classification models. Below, we first describe
the motivation of the proposed attack. Then, we turn to
technical details.
Figure 2. Semantic distinction between foreground and back-
ground. Left: Original image of a train. Middle: Adversarial ex-
ample with `∞ bounded perturbations ( = 60/255) on the back-
ground, the sematic meaning (train) is preserved. Right: Adversar-
ial example with with `∞ bounded perturbations ( = 60/255) on
the foreground, the semantics are broken.
3.1. Motivation
Our threat model is motivated by the feature integration
theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) in cognitive science:
regions that have features that are different from their sur-
roundings are more likely to catch a viewer’s gaze. Such
regions are called salient regions, or foreground, while the
others are called background. Accordingly, for a given im-
age, the semantics of the object of interest is more likely
to be preserved in the foreground, as it catches more visual
attention of a viewer compared to the background. If the
foreground of an image is corrupted, then the semantics of
the object of interest is broken. In contrast, the same extent
of corruption in the background nevertheless preserves the
overall semantic meaning of the scene captured (see, e.g.,
Figure 2). Indeed, detection of salient regions, as well as
the segmentation of foreground and background, have been
extensively studied in computer vision (Borji et al., 2015).
These approaches either predict human fixations, which are
sparse bubble-like salient regions sampled from a distribu-
tion (Kmmerer et al., 2017), or salient objects that contain
smooth connected areas in an image (He & Pugeault, 2018).
Despite this important cognitive distinction between fore-
ground and background, essentially all of the attacks on
deep neural networks for image classification make no such
distinction, even though a number of other semantic fac-
tors have been considered (Bhattad et al., 2020; Mohapatra
et al., 2020). Rather, much of the focus has been on ad-
versarial perturbations that are not noticeable to a human,
but which are applied equally to the entire image. How-
ever, in security applications, the important issue is not
merely that an attack cannot be noticed, but that whatever
is observed is not suspicious. This is, indeed, the frame of
reference for many high-profile physical attacks on image
classification, which are clearly visible, but not suspicious
because they hide in the “human psyche”, that is, are easily
ignored (Sharif et al., 2016; Eykholt et al., 2018). The main
goal of the threat model we introduce next is therefore to
capture more precisely the notion that an adversarial exam-
ple is not suspicious by leveraging the cognitive distinction
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between foreground and background of an image.
3.2. Dual-Perturbation Attacks
At the high level, our proposed threat model involves pro-
ducing small (imperceptible) adversarial perturbations in
the foreground of an image, and larger perturbations in the
background. This can be done by incorporating state-of-
the-art attacks into our method: we can use one attack with
small  in the foreground, and another with a large  in the
background. Consequently, we term our approach dual-
perturbation attacks. Note that these clearly generalize the
standard small-norm (e.g., PGD) attacks, since we can set
the  to be identical in both the foreground and background.
Formally, the dual-perturbation attack solves the following
optimization problem:
max
||δ◦F(x)||p≤F ,||δ◦B(x)||p≤B
L (hθ(x+ δ), y) (5)
whereF returns the mask matrix constraining the area of the
perturbation in the foreground, and B returns the mask ma-
trix restricting the area of the perturbation in the background,
for an input image x. F(x) and B(x) have the same dimen-
sion as x and contain 1s in the area which can be perturbed
and 0s elsewhere. ◦ denotes element-wise multiplication
for matrices. Hence, we have x = F(x) + B(x) which
indicates that any input image can be decomposed into two
independent images: one containing just the foreground,
and the other containing the background.
A natural approach for solving the optimization problem
shown in Eq.(5) is to apply an iterative method, such as
the PGD attack, as shown in (2). However, the use of this
approach poses two challenges in our setting. First, as in
the PGD attack, the problem is non-convex, and PGD only
converges to a local optimum. We can address this issue by
using random starts, i.e. by randomly initializing the start-
ing point of the adversarial perturbations, as in Madry et al.
(2018). Second, and unlike PGD, the optimization problem
in Eq.(5) involves two hard constraints ||δ ◦ F(x)||p ≤ F
and ||δ ◦ B(x)||p ≤ B . Thus, the feasible region of the
adversarial perturbation δ is not an `p ball, which makes
computing the projection P computationally challenging
in high-dimensional settings. To address this challenge, we
split the dual-perturbation attack into two individual pro-
cesses in each iteration, one for the adversarial perturbation
in the foreground and the other for the background, and then
merge these two perturbations when computing the gradi-
ents, like a standard PGD attack. Specifically, we use the
following steps to solve the optimization problem in Eq.(5):
1. Initialization. Start with a random initial starting point
δ(0). To do this, randomly sample a data point δ(0)F in
`p ball ∆(F ) and δ
(0)
B in ∆(B). Then, δ
(0) can be
obtained by using δ(0) = δ(0)F ◦ F(x) + δ(0)B ◦ B(x).
This ensures that the initial perturbation is feasible in
both foreground and background.
2. Split. At the k-th iteration, split the perturbation δ(k)
into δ(k)F for foreground and δ
(k)
B for background:{
δ
(k)
F = δ
(k) ◦ F(x)
δ
(k)
B = δ
(k) ◦ B(x) . (6)
Then update the foreground and background perturba-
tions seperately using the following rules:{
δ
(k+1)
F = P(δ(k)F + αF · gF )
δ
(k+1)
B = P(δ(k)B + αB · gB)
(7)
where gF is the update that corresponds to the nor-
malized steepest descent constrained in the foreground,
and gB for the background. Specifically,{
gF = G(F(x) ◦ ∇δ(k)L(hθ(x+ δ(k)), y))
gB = G(B(x) ◦ ∇δ(k)L(hθ(x+ δ(k)), y))
(8)
where αF s the stepsize for foreground, and αB is the
stepsize for background.
3. Merge. At the end of the k-th iteration, merge the
perturbations obtained in the last step by using
δ(k+1) = δ
(k+1)
F + δ
(k+1)
B . (9)
δ(k+1) is further used to derive the update for the nor-
malized steepest descent at the next iteration.
4. Return to step 2 or terminate after either a fixed number
of iterations.
In addition to deterministic classifiers that make a determin-
istic prediction for a test sample, our proposed attack can be
adapted to stochastic classifiers that apply randomization
at training and prediction time. For example, for classi-
fiers using randomized smoothing, we can refine Eq.(5) as
follows:
max
||δ◦F(x)||p≤F ,
||δ◦B(x)||p≤B
Eη∼N (0,σ2I)[L (hθ(x+ δ + η), y)] (10)
where σ2 is the variance of the Gaussian data augmentation
in randomized smoothing. 2 The optimization problem in
Eq.(10) can be solved by the same approach used for de-
terministic classifiers, with the following modification on
2Note that the Gaussian perturbations are only used to com-
pute the expection of loss and are not in the resulting adversarial
examples.
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Eq.(8) at the second step:{
gF = G(F(x) ◦ ∇δ(k)Eη[L(hθ(x+ δ(k) + η), y)])
gB = G(B(x) ◦ ∇δ(k)Eη[L(hθ(x+ δ(k) + η), y)])
.
(11)
Now, the question that remains is how to partition an input
image x into foreground, F(x), and background, B(x). We
address this next.
3.3. Identifying Foreground and Background
We now turn to our approach to compute the foreground and
background masks for an input image: Given an input x, we
aim to compute F(x), the foreground mask and B(x), the
background mask. We use two approaches for this: object
detection and segmentation.
Our first approach leverages the object detection ap-
proaches (Redmon & Farhadi, 2018) to obtain the bounding
box of the object of interest as the foreground. A bounding
box is a rectangular box that can be determined by the axis
coordinates in the upper-left corner, and the axis coordinates
in the lower-right corner of the rectangle. Once we obtained
all the bounding boxes of a given image, we can filter out
those that are irrelevant to the object of interest and combine
the remaining boxes such that the area inside the union of
the boxes is identified as foreground, and the area outside is
identified as background.
Our second approach is to make use of semantic segmenta-
tion to provide a partition of the foreground and background
in pixel level. This can be done in two steps: First, we use
state-of-the-art paradigms for semantic segmentation (e.g.,
Long et al. (2015)) to identify pixels that belong to each
corresponding object, as there might be multiple objects in
an image. Next, we identify the pixels that belong to the
object of interest as the foreground pixels, and the others as
background pixels.
We use both of the above approaches in dual-perturbation
attacks when evaluating the robustness of classifiers, as well
as designing robust models. More details are available in
Section 5.
4. Defense against Dual-Perturbation Attacks
Once we are able to compute the dual-perturbation attack,
we can incorporate it into conventional adversarial training
paradigms for defense, as it has been demonstrated that
adversarial training is highly effective in designing classifi-
cation models that are robust to a given attack. Specifically,
we propose two defense approaches that we describe next.
Adversarial Training with dual-perturbation. We re-
place the PGD attack in the adversarial training framework
proposed by Madry et al. (2018), with the proposed dual-
perturbation attack. We term this approach AT-Dual, which
aims to solve the following optimization problem:
min
θ
1
|D|
∑
x,y∈D
max
||δ◦F(x)||p≤F ,
||δ◦B(x)||p≤B
L (hθ(x+ δ), y) (12)
MixTrain with dual-perturbation. As pointed out
by Wang et al. (2018), conventional adversarial training
can at times fail to converge for very strong attacks, and
often significantly degrades clean data accuracy. To address
these concerns, we incorporate dual-perturbation attack with
MixTrain (Wang et al., 2018), a variant of adversarial train-
ing. The resulting approach, Mix-Dual, is formulated as
follows:
min
θ
1
|D|
∑
x,y∈D
max
||δ◦F(x)||p≤F ,
||δ◦B(x)||p≤B
βL1 + (1− β)L2 (13)
where L1 is the loss on adversarial examples such that
L1 = L (hθ(x+ δ), y) ,
and L2 is the loss on clean examples.
L2 = L (hθ(x), y) .
β ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that trades off between L1 and L2.
Note that both AT-Dual and Mix-Dual need to apply object
detection method to identify background and foreground
for any input when solving the inner maximization prob-
lems in Eq.(12) and Eq.(13) at training time. At prediction
time, our approaches classify test samples like any standard
classifiers, which is independent of the semantic partitions
so as to close the backdoors to attacks on object detection
approaches (Xie et al., 2017). We evaluate the effectiveness
of our approaches in Section 5.
5. Experiments
In the section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
dual-perturbation attack and defense approaches (AT-Dual
and Mix-Dual).
5.1. Experimental Setup
Dataset Imagesize
Training
set size
Testing
set size Classes
Segment-6 32× 32× 3 18,000 1,200 6
STL-7 96× 96× 3 1,246 500 7
ImageNet-10 224× 224× 3 3,327 344 10
Table 1. Evaluation datasets.
Datasets. We conducted the experiments on the following
three datasets, listed in Table 1. The first is Segment-6, ob-
tained by pre-processing the Microsoft COCO dataset (Lin
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et al., 2014) to make it compatible with image classifica-
tion tasks. We used semantic segmentation to obtain the
foreground masks on this dataset (see the Supplement for
details). Our second dataset is STL-7, a subset of the STL-
10 dataset (Coates et al., 2011). We chose this subset by
filtering out those the objects of interest of which were not
correctly detected by YOLOv3 (Redmon & Farhadi, 2018),
the state-of-the-art object detection method. For each image
in the dataset, we used YOLOv3 to identify the bounding
box of the object of interest as the foreground. Our third
dataset is ImageNet-10, a 10-class subset of the ImageNet
dataset (Deng et al., 2009). We chose this subset of images
and obtained the corresponding foreground masks by using
the same approach as the STL-7 dataset.
Baselines. The performance of the proposed approach was
compared with two alternative paradigms that have been
proved to boost adversarial robustness: Adversarial Train-
ing with PGD Attacks (henceforth, AT-PGD) proposed in
Madry et al. (2018), the state-of-the-art adversarially ro-
bust training scheme widely used in practice; Randomized
Smoothing (henceforth, RS) in Cohen et al. (2019), which
achieves provably robust classification against `2 attacks.
Additionally, we compared our approach with the classifier
trained on non-adversarial data (henceforth, Clean).
Evaluation Method. For a given classification model, we
evaluated its performance in two ways: 1) Evaluated the
accuracy of prediction on clean test data where no adver-
sarial attacks were attempted. 2) Evaluated its adversarial
robustness against different attacks by using the accuracy of
prediction on corresponding adversarial examples.
Throughout our evaluation, we used both `2 and `∞ norms
as the distance metrics to implement attacks, as well as
the robust classification models that are based on adversar-
ial training. The implementations of attacks and defense
approaches are detailed in the Appendix. Due to space limi-
tations, we only present experimental results of the Clean
model and classification models that are trained to be robust
to `2 norm attacks. The results for `∞ norm are similar and
deferred to the Supplement.
5.2. Saliency Analysis of Dual-Perturbation
Adversarial Examples
We begin by considering a natural question: is our particular
distinction between foreground and background actually
consistent with cognitive salience? In fact, this gives rise
to two distinct considerations: 1) whether foreground as
we identify it is in fact significantly more salient than the
background, and 2) if so, whether background becomes sig-
nificantly more salient as a result of our dual-perturbation
attacks. We answer both of these questions by appealing to
a recent computational model of image salience, DeepGaze
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Figure 3. Examples of fixation prediction of a clean test example
and adversarial example by using `2 dual-perturbation attack. The
bottoms show fixation predictions of each example, where darker
values represent higher probabilities of catching humans’ attention.
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Figure 4. Saliency analysis: foreground score of the original and
`2 dual-perturbation examples in response to different defense
approaches. AT-PGD, AT-Dual, and Mix-Dual are trained by
using `2-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in Table 6 in
the Supplement. RS uses σ = 0.5. Left: STL-7. The `2 dual-
perturbation attack is performed with F = 1 and B = 15. Right:
ImageNet-10. The `2 dual-perturbation attack is performed with
F = 2 and B = 30.
II (Kmmerer et al., 2017).3 Concretely, DeepGaze II out-
puts predicted pixel-level density of human fixations on
an image, as illustrated in Figure 3, with the total density
over the entire image summing to 1. Our measure of rela-
tive salience of the foreground is the foreground score (FS),
which is defined as FS =
∑
i∈{k|F(x)k 6=0} si, where si is
the saliency score produced by DeepGaze II for pixel i of
image x. Since foreground, as a fraction of the image, tends
to be around 50-60%, a score significantly higher than 0.5 in-
dicates that predicted human fixation is relatively localized
to the foreground.
Figure 4 presents the answer to both of the questions above,
using FS as the metric. Specifically, we can see that FS tends
to be close to 0.8 for STL-7, and above 0.8 for ImageNet-10,
both for the original instances (addressing question 1) and
for adversarial instances implemented against a non-robust
deep neural network (addressing question 2). Moreover, we
can see that this score does not statistically significantly de-
3Since DeepGaze II only work on images with more than 35×
35 pixels, we conducted saliency analysis on STL-7 and ImageNet-
10 for the purpose of demonstration.
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Figure 5. Robustness to white-box `2 attacks with a variety of
distortions on Segment-6 (top row), STL-7 (middle row), and
ImageNet-10 (bottom row). AT-PGD, AT-Dual and Mix-Dual
are trained by using `2-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed
in Table 6 in the Supplement. RS uses σ = 0.5. Left: dual-
perturbation attacks. Right: PGD.
crease even when we attack robust classifiers. However, we
do note some tangible decrease in the case of robust classi-
fiers on ImageNet-10, suggesting another interesting dimen-
sion to the problem: it appears more difficult to generate
unsuspicious adversarial examples against robust classifiers.
5.3. Dual-perturbation Attacks on Robust Classifiers
Next, we evaluate the effectiveness of dual-perturbation
attacks against state-of-the-art robust learning methods, as
well as the effectiveness of adversarial training variants
that use dual-perturbation attacks for generating adversarial
examples. We begin by considering white-box attacks, and
subsequently evaluate transferability.
The results for white-box attacks are presented in Figure 5.
First, consider the dual-perturbation attacks (left plots).
Note that in all cases these attacks are highly successful
against both baseline robust classifiers (AT-PGD and RS);
indeed, even relatively small levels of foreground noise
yield near-zero accuracy when accompanied by sufficiently
large background perturbations. For example, when the
perturbation to the foreground is F = 1.0 and background
perturbation is B = 15.0 on STL-7 data, RS achieves robust
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Figure 6. Transferability of adversarial examples on Segment-6
(top row), STL-7 (middle row), and ImageNet-10 (bottom row).
AT-PGD, AT-Dual and Mix-Dual are trained by using correspond-
ing `2-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in Table 6 in the
Supplement. RS uses σ = 0.5. Left: dual-perturbation attacks.
Right: PGD.
accuracy below 10%, while AT-PGD only has 5% robust
accuracy. In contrast, both of the defense approaches dis-
cussed, AT-Dual and Mix-Dual remain significantly more
robust, with an improvement of up to 40% compared to the
baselines, without sacrificing much in accuracy on clean
data. Second, consider the standard PGD attacks (right
plots). It can be observed that all of the robust models are
successful against the `2 PGD attacks. However, in the cases
of the Segment-6 and STL-7 datasets, our defenses exhibit
moderately higher robustness than the baselines under large
distortions of PGD attacks. For example, when the pertur-
bation of the `2 PGD attack is  = 2.0 on the ImageNet-10
data, AT-Dual and Mix-Dual can achieve 10% more robust
accuracy.
Next, we measure the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples among different classification models. To do this, we
first produced adversarial examples by using `2 PGD attack
or dual-perturbation attack on a source model. Then, we
used these examples to evaluate the performance of an inde-
pendent target model, where a higher prediction accuracy
means weaker transferability. The results are presented in
Figure 6. The first observation is that dual-perturbation
attacks exhibit significantly better transferability than the
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Figure 7. Robustness to additional white-box attacks on Segment-6
(top row), STL-7 (middle row), and ImageNet-10 (bottom row).
AT-PGD, AT-Dual and Mix-Dual are trained by using correspond-
ing `2-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in Table 6 in
Appendix. Left: `∞ PGD attacks. Middle: `∞ dual-perturbation
attacks. Right: `0 JSMA attacks.
conventional PGD attacks (transferability is up to 40% better
for dual-perturbation attacks). Second, we can observe that
when either AT-Dual or Mix-Dual are used as the target (i.e.,
defending by adversarial training with dual-perturbation ex-
amples), these are typically resistant to adversarial examples
generated against either the clean model, or against RS and
AT-PGD. This observation obtains even when we use PGD
to generate adversarial examples.
5.4. Generalizability of Defense
It has been observed that robustness against lp-norm-
bounded attacks for one value of p can be fragile when
facing attacks with a different norm lp′ (Sharma & Chen,
2018). Our final goal is to present evidence that the ap-
proaches for defense based on dual-perturbation attacks
remain relatively robust even when faced with attacks gen-
erated using different norms. Here, we show this when
our models are trained using the l2-bounded attacks, and
evaluated against other attacks using other norms. Data for
models trained using l∞-bounded attacks is provided in the
Supplement.
The results are presented in Figure 7. We again present the
results for three datasets: Segment-6 (where foreground is
determined using segmentation), top row, STL-7, middle
row, and ImageNet-10, bottom row. We consider three alter-
native attacks: 1) PGD using the l∞-bounded perturbations,
as in Madry et al. (Madry et al., 2018) (left column in Fig-
ure 7) 2) dual-perturbation attacks with l∞-norm bounds
(middle column in Figure 7), and 3) JSMA, a l0-bounded
attack (Papernot et al., 2016a) (right column in Figure 7).
We additionally considered l2 attacks, per Carlini and Wag-
ner (Carlini & Wagner, 2017), but find that all of the robust
models, whether based on PGD or dual-perturbation attacks,
are successful against these.
Our first observation is that both AT-Dual and Mix-Dual
are significantly more robust to l∞-bounded PGD attacks
than the adversarial training approach in which adversar-
ial examples are generated using l2-bounded PGD attacks.
Moreover, the magnitude of the advantage appears to in-
crease with more complex datasets: the gap is larger for
STL-7 and ImageNet-10 compared to Segment-6. Conse-
quently, training with dual-perturbation attacks already ex-
hibits better ability to generalize to other attacks compared
to conventional adversarial training.
The gap between dual-perturbation-based adversarial train-
ing and standard adversarial training is even more signifi-
cant when we consider l∞ dual-perturbation attacks (middle
column). Here, we see that robustness of PGD-based adver-
sarially trained model is only marginally better than that of
a clean model, whereas both AT-Dual and Mix-Dual remain
relatively robust.
Finally, considering JSMA attacks, we can observe that on
two of the three datasets (Segment-6 and ImageNet), con-
ventionally adversarially trained model remains relatively
robust. However, STL-7 exhibits a case where this model
is indeed fragile to l0-bounded attacks. In contrast, in all of
the cases, the model made robust using dual-perturbation
attacks remains quite robust even as we evaluate against a
different attack, using a different norm.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed the dual-perturbation attack, a
novel threat model that produces unsuspicious adversarial
examples by leveraging the cognitive distinction between
image foreground and background. As we have shown, our
attack can defeat all state-of-the-art defenses. By contrast,
the proposed defense approaches using our attack model can
significantly improve robustness against unsuspicious ad-
versarial examples, with relatively small performance degra-
dation on non-adversarial data. In addition, our defense
approaches can achieve comparable to, or better robustness
than the alternatives in the face of traditional attacks.
Our threat model and defense motivate several new research
questions. The first is whether there are more effective
methods to identify foreground of images. Second, we
noted that our dual-perturbation attacks do at times increase
background salience; are there methods for ensuring that this
does not happen? Third, can we further improve robustness
to dual-perturbation attacks? Finally, while we provide
the first principled approach for quantifying suspiciousness,
there may be effective alternative approaches for doing so.
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A. Datasets
A.1. Segment-6
Similar to Vaishnavi et al. (2019), our Segment-6 dataset is obtained by preprocessing the Microsoft COCO dataset (Lin
et al., 2014) with the following steps: First, we make use of the semantic segmentation mask and bounding boxes of images
in the COCO dataset to produce images, the associated masks, and labels such that each image contains one object of interest.
This makes the dataset compatible with image classification tasks. Then, we crop and resize the images and their semantic
segmentation masks to squared images with 32× 32 pixels. The statistics of the Segment-6 dataset are displayed in Table 2.
Class Number of samplesTraining Test
Train 3,000 200
Bird 3,000 200
Cat 3,000 200
Dog 3,000 200
Toilet 3,000 200
Clock 3,000 200
Total 18,000 1,200
Table 2. Number of samples in each class of the Segment-6 dataset.
A.2. STL-7
The statistics of the STL-7 dataset are displayed in Table 3.
Class Number of samplesTraining Test
Airplane 136 50
Bird 165 70
Car 221 95
Cat 63 28
Dog 200 84
Horse 210 80
Truck 251 93
Total 1,246 500
Table 3. Number of samples in each class of the STL-7 dataset.
A.3. ImageNet-10
The labels and number of images per class in the ImageNet-10 dataset are listed in Table 4.
B. Implementations
We implemented all the attack model, as well as the defense approaches in PyTorch4, an open-source library for neural
network learning. We used the ResNet34 model (He et al., 2016) and standard transfer learning, as the datasets employed in
our experiments do not have a sufficient amount of data to achieve high accuracy. Specifically, we initialized the network
with the model pre-trained on ImageNet, reset the final fully connected layer, and added a normalization layer in front of the
ResNet34 model, which performs a channel-wise transformation of an input by subtracting (0.485, 0.456, 0.406) (the mean
of ImageNet) and then being divided by (0.229, 0.224, 0.225) (the standard deviation of ImageNet); 5 then, we train the
4Available at https://pytorch.org/.
5To fit the Segment-6 dataset which contains much smaller images compared to ImageNet, we also reset the first convolutional layer
of the pre-trained ResNet34 model by reducing the kernel size from 7× 7 to 3× 3, stride from 2 to 1, and pad from 3 to 1.
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Class Number of samplesTraining Test
Airplane 346 42
Car 353 35
Cat 239 26
Dog 304 35
Truck 283 33
Elephant 366 31
Zebra 444 42
Bus 318 35
Bear 291 28
Bicycle 383 37
Total 3,327 344
Table 4. Number of samples in each class of the ImageNet-10 dataset.
Attack Parameter Value Note
`∞ PGD

8/255 for training AT-PGD;
[4, 8, 12, 16]/255 for testing Maximum `∞ perturbation
α /4 Stepsize of PGD
K 7 for training AT-PGD; 20 for testing Number of PGD steps
`∞ dual-perturbation
F
8/255 for training AT-Dual and Mix-Dual;
[4, 8, 12, 16]/255 for testing Maximum `∞ perturbation in foreground
B F ∗ 5 Maximum `∞ perturbation in background
αF F /4 Stepsize of the dual-perturbation in foreground
αB B/4 Stepsize of the dual-perturbation in background
K 7 for training AT-Dual and Mix-Dual; 20 for testing Number of dual-perturbation steps
Table 5. Hyper-parameters of `∞ attacks.
neural networks as usual.
Unless otherwise specified, we used 60 epochs with training batch size 50 for ImageNet-10, and 128 for Segment-6 and
STL-7. We used Adam Optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with initial learning rate of 10−4 for Clean and RS, and 10−3
for AT-PGD, AT-Dual, and Mix-Dual respectively. We dropped the learning rate by 0.1 every 20 epochs. We set β, the
hyper-parameter of Mix-Dual to be 0.5 so as to balance training loss on both non-adversarial and adversarial data. We set
σ = 0.25, 0.5, and 1 for Randomized Smoothing (RS), each used n = 100 noise-corrupted copies for each test sample at
prediction time. Due to space limitations, we only present results for RS with σ = 0.5 in the main body of the paper; the
others are presented in Section D of the Appendix.
As mentioned above, we implemented PGD and dual-perturbation attacks, bounded by both `∞ and `2 norms, to evaluate
robustness of a classification model, as well as to build robust classifiers. We used the semantic segmentation masks on the
Segment-6 dataset and the bounding box masks on STL-7 and ImageNet-10. Note that when we evaluated robustness of
Randomized Smoothing (RS), we used the Smoothed Classifier as the target classifier instead of the Base Classifier (Cohen
et al., 2019), as the former is the one used at prediction time. To do this, we made a small modification to the regular PGD
attack model: the adversary aims to maximize the expected loss of the prediction on adversarial examples with random
Gaussian noise, instead of adversarial examples solely.6 The corresponding formulation is shown as follows:
max
δ∈∆()
Eη∼N (0,σ2I)[L (hθ(x+ δ + η), y)] (14)
where η ∼ N (0, σ2I), σ is the standard deviation of Gaussian noise used by RS at training and prediction time. The above
optimization problem can be solved by a similar approach to the regular PGD attack: the only difference is that at each
iteration k of the attack, we draw N (N = 10 in our experiments) samples of noise, add these to the adversarial example
6Note that the Gaussian perturbations are only used to compute the loss of the prediction; the resulting adversarial examples do not
have Gaussian perturbations.
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Attack Parameter Value Note
`2 PGD

Segment-6: 0.5 for training AT-PGD, [0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0] for testing;
STL-7: 1.0 for training AT-PGD, [0.5,1.0,1.5,2.0] for testing;
ImageNet-10: 2.0 for training AT-PGD, [1.0,2.0,3.0,4.0] for testing
Maximum `2 perturbation
α /40 Stepsize of PGD
K 50 for training AT-PGD; 100 for testing Number of PGD steps
`2 dual-perturbation
F The same value as  Maximum `2 perturbation in foreground
B
F ∗ 5 for Segment-6;
F ∗ 15 for STL-7 and ImageNet-10 Maximum `2 perturbation in background
αF F /40 Stepsize of the dual-perturbation in foreground
αB B/40 Stepsize of the dual-perturbation in background
K 50 for training AT-Dual and Mix-Dual; 100 for testing Number of dual-perturbation steps
Table 6. Hyper-parameters of `2 attacks.
obtained at the current iteration, then compute the average gradient as follows:
δ(k+1) = P(δ(k) + αG( 1
N
∇δ(k)L(hθ(x+ δ(k) + η), y)))
Similarly, we also refined the dual-perturbation attack model when it is applied to examine robustness of RS, described in
Section 3.2 of the paper. We list key hyper-parameters of attacks in Table 5 and Table 6.
C. Experimental Results for `∞ Norm
C.1. Saliency Analysis of `∞ Dual-Perturbation Adversarial Examples
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Figure 8. Saliency analysis: foreground score of the original and `∞ dual-perturbation examples in response to different defense
approaches. AT-PGD, AT-Dual, and Mix-Dual are trained by using `∞-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in Table 5. RS uses
σ = 0.5. The `∞ dual-perturbation attack is performed with F = 8/255 and B = 40/255 Left: STL-7. Right: ImageNet-10.
Figure 8 presents the results of saliency analysis on the original and `∞ dual-perturbation examples. Similar to the results
of the `2-norm case presented in the main body of the paper, we can see that the Foreground Score tends to be above 0.7
for STL-7, and close to 0.7 for ImageNet-10. This indicates that predicted human fixation is relatively localized to the
foreground. Moreover, we can see that the Foreground Score does not significantly decrease for dual-perturbation examples
in response to robust classifiers (AT-PGD, RS, AT-Dual, and Mix-Dual), though we do note some tangible decrease in these
examples on ImageNet-10. This indicates that it is more difficult to produce unsuspicious adversarial examples against
robust models.
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C.2. `∞ Dual-perturbation Attacks on Robust Classifiers
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Figure 9. Robustness to white-box `∞ attacks with a variety of distortions on Segment-6 (left column), STL-7 (middle column), and
ImageNet-10 (right column). AT-PGD, AT-Dual and Mix-Dual are trained by using `∞-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in
Table 5. RS uses σ = 0.5. Top: dual-perturbation attacks. Bottom: PGD.
Figure 9 presents robustness of classifiers (trained by using `∞ attacks) against white-box `∞ attacks. Our observations are
similar to the case of `2 norms presented in Section 5 of the paper. First, our defense approaches, AT-Dual and Mix-Dual,
remain significantly more robust to dual-perturbation attacks compared to the baselines. Second, all of the robust models
remain robust to PGD attacks. A closer look at Figure 9 (bottom) shows that AT-Dual and Mix-Dual exhibit significantly
more robustness than RS under PGD attacks with large distortions on Segment-6 and ImageNet-10 (e.g., when  = 16/255
on Segment-6).
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Figure 10. Transferability of adversarial examples on Segment-6 (left column), STL-7 (middle column), and ImageNet-10 (right column).
AT-PGD, AT-Dual and Mix-Dual are trained by using corresponding `∞-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in Table 5. RS uses
σ = 0.5. Top: dual-perturbation attacks. Bottom: PGD.
Figure 10 presents the transferability of adversarial examples among different classification models. Again, we can observe
that dual-perturbation attacks exhibit significantly better (up to 30%) transferability than the conventional PGD attacks.
Moreover, AT-Dual and Mix-Dual are typically resistant to adversarial examples produced against other classifiers.
Towards Robustness against Unsuspicious Adversarial Examples
C.3. Generalizability of Defense
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Figure 11. Robustness to additional white-box attacks on Segment-6 (top row), STL-7 (middle row), and ImageNet-10 (bottom row).
AT-PGD, AT-Dual and Mix-Dual are trained by using corresponding `∞-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in Table 5. Left: `2
dual-perturbation attacks. Middle: `2 CW attacks. Right: `0 JSMA attacks.
Figure 11 presents the adversarial robustness to additional white-box attacks. Here we evaluate models trained using
`∞-bounded attacks with the following alternative attacks: 1) dual-perturbation attacks with `2-norm bounds (left column in
Figure 11), 2) CW attacks using the `2-bounded perturbations (middle column in Figure 11), and 3) JSMA attacks using
the `0 norms (right column in Figure 11). Our first observation is that the proposed defense approaches, AT-Dual and
Mix-Dual trained by using `∞ dual-perturbation attacks are significantly more robust to `2-bounded dual perturbation attacks
than AT-PGD trained by using `∞-bounded PGD attacks. Our second observation is that the proposed AT-Dual method is
comparable to AT-PGD in defending against CW and JSMA attacks, and the proposed Mix-Dual remains significantly more
resistant to JSMA. However, we do note that using Mix-Dual can at times decrease the robustness to CW compared to the
alternatives. For example, Mix-Dual is indeed fragile to CW attacks on Segment-6; on ImageNet-10, Mix-Dual is relatively
robust to CW compared to the Clean model, but is still significantly less robust than AT-PGD and AT-Dual.
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D. Supplemental Results for Randomized Smoothing
D.1. Variance in Gaussian Data Augmentation
Table 7, 8, 9, and 10 show the effectiveness of Randomized Smoothing (RS) against the proposed dual-perturbation attack.
Here, we use different variances in Gaussian data augmentation of RS, and fix the number of noise-corrupted copies at
prediction time, n to be 100. It can be seen that RS is generally fragile to the dual-perturbation attacks that are adapted
to randomized classifiers. Moreover, increasing σ, the variance used in Gaussian data augmentation can only marginally
improve adversarial robustness to dual-perturbation attacks while significantly decrease accuracy on non-adversarial data.
However, we do observe that the improvement is considerably large (up to 20%) when we increase σ from 0.25 to 0.5 in the
face of `2 dual-perturbation attacks on ImageNet-10.
Dataset Defense approach Attack Strength (B = 5× F )
F = 0/255 F = 4/255 F = 8/255 F = 12/255 F = 1
Segment-6
RS, σ = 0.25 71.4% 9.6% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0%
RS, σ = 0.5 61.7% 13.7% 1.9% 0.6% 0.2%
RS, σ = 1 47.7% 15.6% 2.8% 0.4% 0.2%
STL-7
RS, σ = 0.25 88.8% 27.8% 1.8% 0.2% 0.0%
RS, σ = 0.5 79.2% 35.8% 7.8% 0.6% 0.2%
RS, σ = 1 70.4% 34.4% 9.4% 1.4% 0.4%
ImageNet-10
RS, σ = 0.25 96.2% 18.9% 2.9% 1.2% 0.0%
RS, σ = 0.5 93.3% 38.1% 6.4% 1.7% 1.7%
RS, σ = 1 87.2% 37.5% 12.5% 4.1% 2.6%
Table 7. Robustness of RS against `∞ dual-perturbation attacks.
Defense approach Attack Strength (B = 5× F )
F = 0 F = 0.25 F = 0.5 F = 0.75 F = 1
RS, σ = 0.25 71.4% 29.7% 6.7% 0.9% 0.1%
RS, σ = 0.5 61.7% 31.6% 11.8% 3.1% 1.3%
RS, σ = 1 47.7% 28.2% 14.4% 6.0% 1.5%
Table 8. Robustness of RS against `2 dual-perturbation attacks on Segment-6.
Defense approach Attack Strength (B = 15× F )
F = 0 F = 0.5 F = 1 F = 1.5 F = 2
RS, σ = 0.25 88.8% 29.2% 5.8% 1.0% 0.4%
RS, σ = 0.5 79.2% 34.2% 10.4% 3.6% 1.2%
RS, σ = 1 70.4% 31.0% 11.8% 3.6% 2.0%
Table 9. Robustness of RS against `2 dual-perturbation attacks on STL-7.
Defense approach Attack Strength (B = 15× F )
F = 0 F = 1 F = 2 F = 3 F = 4
RS, σ = 0.25 96.2% 18.0% 3.8% 2.6% 2.0%
RS, σ = 0.5 93.2% 34.6% 11.3% 3.8% 2.6%
RS, σ = 1 87.2% 38.4% 15.4% 8.1% 5.2%
Table 10. Robustness of RS against `2 dual-perturbation attacks on ImageNet-10.
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D.2. Number of Samples with Gaussian Noise at Prediction Time
It has been observed that Randomized Smoothing (RS) can be computationally inefficient at prediction time as it uses a
large number of noise-corrupted copies for each test sample at prediction time. It is natural to ask whether the prediction
time of RS can be reduced without significantly sacrificing adversarial robustness in practice. We answer this question by
studying the effectiveness of RS with different n, the numbers of noise-corrupted copies at prediction time. Specifically, we
fix σ = 0.5 and set n to be 1, 25, and 100. Note that when n = 1, there is no two-sided hypothesis test for prediction; thus,
no abstentions are obtained.
Here we use `∞ dual-perturbation attacks on RS for demonstration purposes. The results are shown in Table 11. It can be
seen that when n = 25, the accuracy on both adversarial and non-adversarial data can drop by up to 10% compared to
RS using n = 100. The reason is that under a small n, the prediction appears more likely to abstain. Interestingly, when
n = 1, the accuracy can be marginally improved compared to n = 100, with the prediction time being reduced by 99%.
This indicates that in practice, we would not lose accuracy without using the two-sided hypothesis test at prediction time.
Dataset Defense approach Attack Strength (B = 5× F )
F = 0/255 F = 4/255 F = 8/255 F = 12/255 F = 1
Segment-6
RS, n = 1 66.0% 19.8% 3.2% 0.8% 0.3%
RS, n = 25 49.4% 9.1% 1.3% 0.5% 0.0%
RS, n = 100 61.7% 13.7% 1.9% 0.6% 0.2%
STL-7
RS, n = 1 81.8% 44.2% 11.2% 1.6% 0.2%
RS, n = 25 73.0% 29.0% 5.8% 0.4% 0.2%
RS, n = 100 79.2% 35.8% 7.8% 0.6% 0.2%
ImageNet-10
RS, n = 1 93.9% 40.9% 7.6% 2.0% 1.7%
RS, n = 25 89.8% 34.3% 5.5% 1.7% 1.7%
RS, n = 100 93.3% 38.1% 6.4% 1.7% 1.7%
Table 11. Robustness of RS against `∞ dual-perturbation attacks under different numbers of noise-corrupted copies at prediction time.
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E. Examples of Dual-Perturbation Attacks
E.1. `2 dual-perturbation examples on Segment-6
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Figure 12. Segment-6: original examples and `2 dual-perturbation examples in response to different defense approaches. AT-PGD,
AT-Dual and Mix-Dual are trained by using corresponding `2-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in Table 6. RS uses σ = 0.5.
Adversarial examples are produced by white-box `2 dual-perturbation attack (F = 0.5 and B = 2.5) against corresponding classifiers.
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E.2. `2 dual-perturbation examples on STL-7
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Figure 13. STL-7: original examples and `2 dual-perturbation examples in response to different defense approaches. AT-PGD, AT-Dual
and Mix-Dual are trained by using corresponding `2-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in Table 6. RS uses σ = 0.5. Adversarial
examples are produced by white-box `2 dual-perturbation attack (F = 1 and B = 15) against corresponding classifiers.
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E.3. `2 dual-perturbation examples on ImageNet-10
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Figure 14. ImageNet-10: original examples and `2 dual-perturbation examples in response to different defense approaches. AT-PGD,
AT-Dual and Mix-Dual are trained by using corresponding `2-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in Table 6. RS uses σ = 0.5.
Adversarial examples are produced by white-box `2 dual-perturbation attack (F = 2 and B = 30) against corresponding classifiers.
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E.4. `∞ dual-perturbation examples on Segment-6
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Figure 15. Segment-6: original examples and `∞ dual-perturbation examples in response to different defense approaches. AT-PGD,
AT-Dual and Mix-Dual are trained by using corresponding `∞-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in Table 5. RS uses σ = 0.5.
Adversarial examples are produced by `∞ dual-perturbation attack (F = 8/255 and B = 40/255) against corresponding classifiers.
Towards Robustness against Unsuspicious Adversarial Examples
E.5. `∞ dual-perturbation examples on STL-7
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Figure 16. STL-7: original examples and `∞ dual-perturbation examples in response to different defense approaches. AT-PGD, AT-Dual
and Mix-Dual are trained by using corresponding `∞-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in Table 5. RS uses σ = 0.5. Adversarial
examples are produced by `∞ dual-perturbation attack (F = 8/255 and B = 40/255) against corresponding classifiers.
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E.6. `∞ dual-perturbation examples on ImageNet-10
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Figure 17. ImageNet-10: original examples and `∞ dual-perturbation examples in response to different defense approaches. AT-PGD,
AT-Dual and Mix-Dual are trained by using corresponding `∞-norm attacks with hyper-parameters listed in Table 5. RS uses σ = 0.5.
Adversarial examples are produced by `∞ dual-perturbation attack (F = 8/255 and B = 40/255) against corresponding classifiers.
